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3 
DO THE PROPOSED TITLE IX REGULATIONS 
PROTECT OR UNDERMINE DUE PROCESS? 
Michelle J. Anderson* 
 
Due process for those accused of sexual misconduct on college campuses 
has arisen as an area of increased concern. Many scholars focus on whether 
the (usually) male students accused of sexual assault and harassment get a 
fair shake in the quasi-judicial disciplinary proceedings mandated by Title 
IX, the federal civil rights law that prohibits sex discrimination in educational 
institutions. 
For example, dozens of law professors from Harvard and the University of 
Pennsylvania have denounced their institutions’ disciplinary procedures to 
address campus sexual assault, arguing that they fail to grant accused 
students due process.1  The rhetoric around this issue has escalated over time.  
Yale Law Professor Jed Rubenfeld argued that campus adjudication of sexual 
assault is “inherently unreliable and error-prone.”2  Harvard Law Professor 
Janet Halley then argued that campus sexual assault adjudications “are taking 
us back to pre-Magna Carta, pre-due-process procedures.”3 
Strong words.  Some of the loudest voices in the debate on campus sexual 
assault now focus on the rights of those accused of sexual assault instead of 
those victimized by it.  This was not always the case.  The focus for many 
 
*  President of Brooklyn College. This essay is based on comments that the City University 
of New York submitted in response to the November 2018 Department of Education’s 
proposed regulations to implement Title IX. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, 
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-
harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3CYJ-JHXS]; Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law School Faculty 
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6Q5-
9DQV]; Joseph Cohn, Campus Is a Poor Court for Students Facing Sexual-Misconduct 
Charges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Campus-Is-a-
Poor-Court-for/134770 [https://perma.cc/C3R8-FSH4]; Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice, 
AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/sex-lies-and-justice 
[https://perma.cc/RRC8-34HB]. 
 2. Jed Rubenfeld, Opinion, Mishandling Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandling-rape.html 
[https://perma.cc/EUG3-6P58]. 
 3. David G. Savage & Timothy M. Phelps, How a Little-Known Education Office Has 
Forced Far-Reaching Changes to Campus Sex Assault Investigations, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 
2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-campus-sexual-assault-20150817-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/DKU5-GA9H]. 
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years was on the incidence of campus sexual assault and how frequently 
campuses failed to respond to it.4 
Sexual harassment and sexual assault are both serious problems on college 
campuses.5  According to research by the Association of American 
Universities, 26.1 percent of senior females, 6.3 percent of senior males, and 
29.5 percent of seniors identifying as transgender, genderqueer, non-
conforming, or questioning have experienced penetration or sexual touching 
by physical force or incapacitation since entering an institution of higher 
education.6  About 60 percent of both female and male college students 
experience some form of sexual harassment.7  Sexual harassment and sexual 
assault are both associated with impaired academic outcomes, including 
“lower academic efficacy, higher stress, lower institutional commitment, and 
lower scholastic conscientiousness.”8 
Moreover, sexual assault disproportionately harms women; 84 percent of 
sexual assault and rape victims are female.9  That gender bias has legal 
implications for colleges.  In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX,10 which states:  
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
 
 4. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, 
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. 
L. REV. 945 (2004). 
 5. One-fifth to one-fourth of female students are victims of attempted or completed rape 
while in higher educational institutions. BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 10 (2000). 
 6. DAVID CANTOR ET AL., THE ASS’N. OF AM. UNIVS., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS 
CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT xiii (2015). 
 7. CATHERINE HILL & ELENA SILVA, AM. ASS’N. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., 
DRAWING THE LINE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 18 (2005). 
 8. VICTORIA L. BANYARD ET AL., ACADEMIC CORRELATES OF UNWANTED SEXUAL 
CONTACT, INTERCOURSE, STALKING, AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:  AN UNDERSTUDIED 
BUT IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS 11 (2017).  Moreover, about 31 
percent of rape victims and 7 percent of sexual battery victims across nine schools experienced 
worsened schoolwork or grades. CHRISTOPHER KREBS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY VALIDATION STUDY FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 113 (2016). About 8 
percent of rape victims and 2 percent of sexual battery victims dropped classes or changed 
their schedules. Id. at 114.  Additionally, about 11 percent of rape victims and 4 percent of 
sexual battery victims wanted to drop classes or change their schedules. Id. 
 9. Kathryn Casteel et al., What We Know about Victims of Sexual Assault in America, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 2, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/sexual-
assault-victims/ [https://perma.cc/UD3X-SMU2].  Sexual assault disproportionately harms 
lower income individuals as well. Id. 44 percent of sexual assault and rape victims who 
participated in a recent survey came from families making less than $25,000 per year. Id. When 
one compares the victimization data between the lowest and highest income individuals, the 
comparison is even more extreme.  Indeed, according to the survey, people with household 
incomes of less than $7,500 experience 12 times the victimization rate as those with household 
incomes greater than $75,000. Id.  At the same time, people of color and immigrants victimized 
by sexual assault may be less likely to report their experiences to authorities for cultural, social, 
and legal reasons, including fear of entanglement in bureaucracy, cultural conditioning against 
questioning authority, and pressure to protect those who engage in sexual misconduct. See 
Gayle Pollard-Terry, For African American Rape Victims, A Culture of Silence, L.A. TIMES 
(July 20, 2004), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-jul-20-et-pollard20-
story.html [https://perma.cc/8FHV-FCYC]. 
 10. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901–07, 86 Stat. 235, 373–
75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–86 (2012)). 
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participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . .”11 
In 2011, under the Obama administration, the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued guidance in the form of a 
“Dear Colleague Letter” on Title IX.12  In the letter, OCR reaffirmed that 
“sexual violence[] interferes with students’ right to receive an education free 
from discrimination.”13  OCR required that schools “take immediate and 
effective steps to end . . . sexual violence.”14  OCR stressed the need for equal 
treatment of both the accuser and accused, demanding “[a]dequate, reliable, 
and impartial investigation of complaints.”15  It also affirmed that Title IX 
requires schools to adopt and publish grievance procedures, including 
specific timeframes, which must deliver to students a “prompt and equitable 
resolution.”16 
In part because of the Dear Colleague Letter, colleges and universities 
stepped up their efforts to take the issue of sexual assault seriously.  But 
pushback against these efforts was swift and strong, led in part by the law 
professors mentioned above, as well as parents of those accused of sexual 
assault.17  When the Trump administration took the White House, there was 
bound to be a reversal in course. 
Early in her tenure, the new Education Secretary Betsy DeVos rescinded 
the Obama-era Dear Colleague Letter and convened a listening tour to 
discuss the impact of Title IX enforcement on students, families and 
institutions.18  In addition to meeting with victims’ rights advocates, DeVos 
made a point to interview “[s]tudents who have been falsely accused and 
disciplined under Title IX”19 and men’s rights advocates.20 
Thereafter, DeVos issued new proposed regulations to implement Title 
IX.21  These regulations strongly favor the accused over the accuser.  
Consistent with what the Trump administration has done with other civil 
 
 11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 12. Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t 
Educ. Office for Civil Rights (Apr. 4, 2011) (withdrawn), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ES5B-QUH5]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Secretary DeVos to Host Title IX Listening Sessions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 
12, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-host-title-ix-listening-
sessions [https://perma.cc/2VBQ-WDQ3]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Anna North, “This Will Make Schools Less Safe”: Why Betsy DeVos’s Sexual Assault 
Rules Have Advocates Worried, VOX (Nov. 16, 2018, 12:50 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/16/18096736/betsy-devos-sexual-assault-
harassment-title-ix [https://perma.cc/U7UJ-CXCE]. 
 21. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified 
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) [hereinafter Proposal]. 
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rights statutes, the regulations severely limit the reach and scope of Title IX.  
Their biggest limitations include the following: 
• The proposed Title IX regulations narrow the definition of sexual 
harassment.  Under the Department of Education’s prior guidance, 
the definition was sexual conduct that was “sufficiently severe, 
pervasive, or persistent so as to interfere with or limit a student’s 
ability to participate in or benefit from the services, activities, or 
opportunities offered by a school.”22  The proposed regulations 
change the “or” to an “and,” and define actionable sexual 
harassment as “unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively 
denies a person equal access to the recipient’s education program 
or activity.”23 
• The proposed regulations require colleges to dismiss complaints 
regarding behavior that occurs outside their own “education 
program or activity.”24  Because the vast majority of educational 
programs and activities happen on campus, the regulations 
essentially limit Title IX coverage to behavior that occurs on 
campus.  As they mandate, “[i]f the conduct alleged by the 
complainant . . . did not occur within the recipient’s program or 
activity, the recipient must dismiss the formal complaint with 
regard to that conduct.”25 
• The proposed regulations limit institutional liability to 
circumstances in which there is actual knowledge of a complaint 
of sexual misconduct.  Previous Department of Education 
guidance indicated, “[a] school is responsible for addressing 
harassment incidents about which it knows or reasonably should 
have known.”26  The “knew or should have known” standard 
applies to harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.27  The proposed 
regulations, however, change the standard from “knew or should 
have known” to require “actual knowledge”28 of allegations of 
 
 22. Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t 
Educ. Office for Civil Rights (Oct. 26, 2010) (withdrawn), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C4XJ-4HZG]. 
 23. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.30. 
 24. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a). 
 25. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3). 
 26. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 22. 
 27. See Harassment, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (last visited Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/22FU-F2V4] (stating that “[t]he 
employer will be liable for harassment by non-supervisory employees or non-employees over 
whom it has control (e.g., independent contractors or customers on the premises), if it knew, 
or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate 
corrective action”). 
 28. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a). 
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harassment reported to a “Title IX Coordinator or any official of 
the recipient who has the authority to institute corrective 
measures,”29 which, at most institutions, is limited to the 
president. 
Although there are serious concerns with each of these limitations, this essay 
will focus on due process, since cries of a lack of due process gave rise to the 
regulations themselves. 
To be sure, some requirements in the proposed regulations are fair, 
equitable, and essential to due process.  For example, the requirements for 
published procedures, notice of allegations, equitable treatment of 
complainant and respondent, equal opportunity to present witnesses and 
evidence, an objective assessment of the facts, a prohibition on conflicts of 
interest, the training of decision-makers and other employees involved, and 
reasonably prompt timeframes are all appropriate and necessary.30 
However, the proposed regulations mandate grievance procedures that are 
prohibitively complex and burdensome.  Their innumerable requirements are 
unfair, both to complainants and to institutions of higher education.  Myriad 
minute requirements dictate college behavior, overwhelmingly in ways that 
favor (predominately male) respondents over (predominately female) 
complainants. 
Many of the ideas for heightened process in grievance procedures in favor 
of respondents came from law professors teaching in resource-rich 
institutions.31  In cases of alleged sexual misconduct, they argued that 
colleges should be required to provide students accused of sexual misconduct 
with full adversarial hearings, the right to an attorney, and the right to 
confront and cross-examine their accusers.32  However, underfunded 
colleges and universities across the country, the vast majority of which have 
no law schools attached to them, do not have the resources to carry out the 
regulations’ complex mandates, which would expose them to heightened 
Title IX liability compared to their better-funded counterparts. 
Instead of relying on the academic judgment of educational institutions, the 
proposed regulations impose multipart, impracticable obligations.  To call the 
regulations onerous is an understatement.  There are more than 100 
requirements imposed upon institutions of higher education for the process 
of investigations and formal hearings.33 
 
 29. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. C.F.R. § 106.30. 
 30. See Proposal at 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.45(b)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), (v), & (b)(3)(ii). 
 31. See, e.g., Jamie D. Halper, Harvard Law School Faculty Call for Title IX Sexual 
Assault Policy Changes, HARV. CRIMSON (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/9/1/law-faculty-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/EL2S-
Z9JA]; Eugene Volokh, Open Letter from 16 Penn Law School Professors about Title IX and 
Sexual Assault Complaints, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/19/open-letter-from-
16-penn-law-school-professors-about-title-ix-and-sexual-assault-complaints/ 
[https://perma.cc/3AP9-EXEM]; Rubenfeld, supra note 2. 
 32. Bartholet et al., supra note 1; Open Letter, supra note 1. 
 33. See Proposal at 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.8(b)(2)(ii)(c), 106.45(a)–(b)(7)(ii). 
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The sheer volume and detail of the many added requirements in the 
proposed grievance procedures are overwhelming.  Many do little to nothing 
to enhance fairness or due process; at the same time, they add substantial 
complexity and cost, making compliance practically impossible, especially 
for under-resourced institutions. 
For example, every written disposition in a student disciplinary proceeding 
resolving an allegation of sexual harassment must recite every procedural step 
that the Title IX officer took throughout the entire investigation, before the 
hearing was even held:  “from the receipt of the complaint through the 
determination, including any notifications to the parties, interviews with 
parties and witnesses, site visits, methods used to gather other evidence, and 
hearings held.”34  This is a level of detail in written dispositions not required 
of federal judges. 
The proposed regulations additionally require that decision-makers’ 
written dispositions include: “[f]indings of fact supporting the 
determination,” “[c]onclusions regarding the application of the recipient’s 
policy to the facts,” “[a] statement of, and rationale for, the result as to each 
allegation, including a determination regarding responsibility, any sanctions 
the recipient imposes on the respondent, and any remedies provided by the 
recipient to the complainant designed to restore or preserve access to the 
recipient’s education program or activity,” the procedures for appeal, and the 
permissible bases for appeal.35  None of these possible features of written 
dispositions in disciplinary proceedings is objectionable on its own, to be 
sure.  They are standard fare for lawyers and judges.  But they should not 
each be required of a layperson—a college employee in student affairs, for 
instance, drafted to the role of decision-maker to help adjudicate one case—
especially when most sitting trial court judges do not issue written decisions 
with this level of detail, and no one claims that due process was compromised.  
To impose these kinds of detailed requirements on colleges is arbitrary and 
unduly burdensome.36 
Many of the proposed requirements in the grievance procedures would not 
meaningfully advance the core fairness of the proceedings or the due process 
of the parties, but they would create an enormous administrative burden.  
They would be unwieldy, especially for public colleges and other lesser-
resourced institutions.  Many of them merit special attention. 
1)  Attorneys or Advisors 
The proposed regulations require colleges to provide both the complainant 
and the respondent with attorneys or advisors who are able to function as 
attorneys for the mandated live hearing and mandated cross-examination 
 
 34. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
 35. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(4)(ii)(C)–(F). 
 36. These requirements are not even required under the Violence Against Women Act or 
the Clery Act for determinations of equally or more serious student misconduct, such as 
assault, arson, or kidnapping. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 
(1994). 
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process.37  Low- and moderate-income students will ordinarily not have the 
financial resources to hire their own attorneys or advisors for these 
proceedings. 
It will be extremely difficult for colleges to fulfill this mandate with 
internal staff—that is, to find college employees willing to function as actual 
attorneys in these cases, required to, for instance, cross-examine alleged 
sexual assault victims during live disciplinary proceedings.  Colleges would 
instead be compelled to incur considerable expense to hire outside advocates 
for the hearings. 
Under the proposed regulations, colleges would need either to hire actual 
attorneys or to hire lay advisors and train them on techniques for casting 
doubt on a student’s credibility, which is the function of cross-examination.  
Such hiring and training would be costly.  Lesser endowed public colleges do 
not have the financial resources to hire attorneys or to hire and train advisors 
who would function as attorneys for both of the parties in each of these 
disputes. 
If one party has hired an attorney, the college may also be required to hire 
a licensed attorney for the opposing party to ensure parity between them.  
Otherwise, if a lawyer questions one student and a non-lawyer advisor 
questions the opposing party, the financial disparity between them may result 
in inequality in the proceedings.  Again, colleges would then have to incur 
significant expenses. 
2)  Cross-Examination 
Under prior Department of Education guidance, direct cross-examination 
by attorneys or advocates was impermissible because it was understood to 
threaten complainants and deter legitimate reports of sexual harassment.38  
Under previous guidance, parties were permitted to submit questions to a 
neutral hearing officer who then would ask the questions of the parties.39  
Many courts have found that the parties received fairness and due process 
through this kind of questioning by a neutral hearing officer.40 
Under the proposed regulations, however, the questioning process would 
become direct and adversarial, involving the actual cross-examination of 
witnesses and parties.41  The complainant would be questioned, not by a 
neutral hearing officer or a neutral investigator, but directly by an attorney or 
a trained advocate for the respondent.  The attorney or trained advocate would 
question parties and witnesses with the intent of undermining their stories or 
painting them as biased or themselves responsible for wrongdoing.  This kind 
 
 37. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(vii). 
 38. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 12. 
 39. Questions & Answers on Title IX & Sexual Violence, U.S. DEPT. EDUC. OFFICE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS § F-6 (2014) (withdrawn), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-
201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB9C-S9P5]. 
 40. See, e.g., Haidak v. Univ. of Mass. at Amherst, 299 F. Supp. 3d 242, 268 (D. Mass. 
2018). 
 41. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(vii). 
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of probing by advocates may intimidate student witnesses, revictimize 
complainants, and deter them both from participating in investigations. 
Moreover, under the proposed regulations, colleges may “not limit the 
choice of advisor.”42  Parties may therefore choose to have a parent or a 
classmate function as an advisor.  The parent of a complainant or respondent 
would then have the authority to question their child’s accuser or alleged 
assailant.  The best friend of the respondent could directly cross-examine the 
complainant, or vice versa.  A legitimate fear of being questioned by the 
parent or best friend of the opposing party, or another individual partial to the 
opposing side, may deter victims from filing formal complaints and 
discourage witnesses from participating in hearings. 
3)  All Evidence Review 
Under the proposed regulations, colleges must “[p]rovide both parties an 
equal opportunity to inspect and review any evidence obtained as part of the 
investigation that is directly related to the allegations raised in a formal 
complaint, including the evidence upon which the recipient does not intend 
to rely in reaching a determination regarding responsibility . . . .”43 
Under the regulations, therefore, all evidence related to an incident that the 
investigator ever receives or obtains as part of the investigation must be 
turned over to both parties, no matter how irrelevant, inflammatory, 
distracting, or prejudicial.  This kind of all evidence review would even 
include evidence related to the prior sexual history of the complainant or other 
witnesses that could not be relied upon in reaching a determination. 
The proposed regulations are clear that the complainant’s prior sexual 
history would be excluded from the hearing itself.44  However, if information 
about the prior sexual history of the parties or witnesses were somewhere in 
the evidence that the Title IX coordinator received during an investigation, 
as it often is, it would have to be disclosed to both parties as part of the all 
evidence review.   
The disclosure of this kind of evidence could lead to the publication of 
sensitive and private materials of either party or non-parties, the public 
disparagement or harassment of either party or non-parties, and retaliation 
against either party or non-parties.  The requirement that all evidence must be 
turned over to both parties would dissuade both witnesses and complainants 
from providing evidence to investigators, as they would recognize that 
evidence would be turned over to both parties, regardless of how the 
investigators assessed the evidence.  The resultant withholding of information 
would decrease the accuracy of investigations. 
The negative effects of an all evidence review would most commonly 
befall complainants.  The scope of the mandated disclosure in an all evidence 
 
 42. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(iv). 
 43. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(viii). 
 44. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(vii). 
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review would be experienced as harassing itself, and would deter 
complainants from pursuing formal charges. 
The proposed regulations mandate an unprecedented amount of evidence 
disclosure.  They are broader than the scope of discovery in a civil case, 
which limits discovery to nonprivileged and relevant information, and allows 
for nondisclosure when the burden of discovery outweighs its benefits.45  The 
proposed regulations are also broader than the disclosure required in criminal 
cases, where life and liberty are at stake, which requires the prosecution to 
provide the defendant with only exculpatory evidence,46 rather than all the 
evidence ever collected in a case.  The proposed regulations are both 
unprecedented and arbitrary. 
4)  Digital Evidence Review 
Under the proposed regulations, prior to the completion of an investigative 
report, a college “must send to each party and the party’s advisor, if any, the 
evidence subject to inspection and review in an electronic format, such as a 
file sharing platform, that restricts the parties and advisors from downloading 
or copying the evidence . . . .”47 
The proposed regulations require that colleges must deliver all gathered 
evidence in digital format to both parties.  Nothing of the sort has ever been 
required by the Department of Education under Title IX, and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require digital discovery in civil cases.48  
This is an unprecedented requirement. 
Underfunded institutions of higher education do not have the resources to 
digitize all the evidence in each case and share it with the parties in an 
electronic format.  A lot of the evidence in disciplinary cases is collected in 
hard copy, in printed form.  A lot of evidence is digital already, but not in a 
consistent format for sharing on a group platform.  It would be costly to 
digitize all physical documents and systematize the digital format of all 
disparate digital materials and then upload them all to a system to share with 
the parties.  There would be no benefit to such an arrangement, while the 
financial costs to colleges would be substantial. 
Moreover, the potential psychological costs of mandated digital review 
would be extreme.  If all evidence in a case were provided to the parties in 
digital form, it could be easily and widely shared.  Often in cases involving 
 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, 
considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the 
parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible 
in evidence to be discoverable.”). 
 46. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (disallowing “suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused” because it violates due process “where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”). 
 47. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(viii). 
 48. See, e.g., supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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sexual harassment or sexual assault, the email and text communication 
between parties is charged, unusual, or sexualized.  If colleges must provide 
all evidence to both parties, there is no way to ensure that it would not be 
shared with others, for instance, on social media. 
Sharing personal text messages or communications on social media can be 
traumatic, and it may expose sensitive information about the parties or non-
parties.  Once parties are made aware that all evidence collected will be 
provided to both parties in digital form, and there is a risk that one of the 
parties may have it leaked, publish in a newspaper, print it on flyers, email it, 
or post it on social media, complainants will be much less likely to file Title 
IX complaints.  Potential leaks of sensitive information related to the case can 
also harm respondents, as well as non-parties, including witnesses who will 
be less likely to agree to participate in investigations.  Digital transmission of 
all evidence collected in a case is a tool of potential harassment and mischief. 
The regulations assert that institutions will somehow provide all the digital 
evidence “in an electronic format, such as a file sharing platform, that restricts 
the parties and advisors from downloading or copying the evidence . . . .”49  
The notion that there is a format that allows someone to view information 
digitally, but not copy it, is utterly fanciful.  A cell phone can photograph a 
computer screen of evidence in less than a second for a ready, public post to 
social media. 
5)  Rules of Evidence Training 
Under the proposed regulations, “[t]he decision-maker must explain to the 
party’s advisor asking cross-examination questions any decision to exclude 
questions as not relevant.”50  The regulations require the decision-maker to 
explain the exclusion of certain evidence from the hearing to the party’s 
advisor or attorney.  This requirement raises concerns regarding the training 
of both the decision-makers and the advisors. 
In order to make the decision to exclude evidence, a decision-maker would 
have to be trained sufficiently in the rules of evidence for exclusion.  The 
college would have a very hard time finding an internal staff member for 
this job.  It would be nearly impossible to find a layperson with sufficient 
knowledge of evidence law to provide real-time responses and decisions to 
questions and objections in a live, formal hearing.  Outside of law schools, 
almost no college employees would be appropriate for that duty.  Most 
colleges would have to hire outside counsel or retired judges to serve as 
decision-makers in these hearings.  Most public colleges, and many private 
colleges, simply will not have the resources to hire outside counsel or judges 
to conduct live hearings, nor will they have the resources to hire and train 
laypersons to function as judges in live hearings.  These proposed regulations 
would be cost-prohibitive to lesser-resourced, public institutions. 
 
 49. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(viii). 
 50. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(3)(vii). 
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6)  Complexity and Safe Harbor 
Overall, the grievance procedures in the proposed regulation are 
cumbersome and cost-prohibitive.  Most colleges cannot afford to hire 
attorneys for both parties or to hire and train advisors who function as 
attorneys for both parties or to hire and train decision-makers who function 
as judges in each one of these disciplinary proceedings.  Most colleges cannot 
afford to digitize all evidence and deliver it to the parties, and the risks of 
doing so are too great. 
The requirements of direct cross-examination by attorneys or trained 
advisors for the opposing parties, all evidence review by both parties that 
includes evidence of the parties’ and non-parties’ prior sexual history, and 
digital evidence review that is easily copied and shared would open the door 
to alarming harassment.  The proposed regulations would engender fear, 
especially on the part of complainants:  fear of retaliation by the respondent 
or his friends, fear of being questioned by the respondent’s attorney or trained 
advisor, and fear of embarrassment or trauma because all evidence would be 
shared electronically and could not be shielded from exposure on social 
media.  These regulations would deter victims of sexual harassment from 
lodging formal complaints, discourage witnesses from participating in 
investigations, erode confidence in the disciplinary system, imperil the 
privacy rights of all involved, and degrade the educational mission of 
enhancing equal access to higher education. 
A safe harbor provision in the proposed regulations underscores the 
mandatory nature of the detailed, innumerable requirements mapped out in 
the grievance procedures: 
A recipient must follow procedures consistent with [the grievance 
procedures in] § 106.45 in response to a formal complaint.  If the recipient 
follows procedures . . . consistent with § 106.45 in response to a formal 
complaint, the recipient’s response to the formal complaint is not 
deliberately indifferent and does not otherwise constitute discrimination 
under [T]itle IX.51 
This key provision implies that a failure to follow the grievance procedures 
mandated in the proposed regulations could or would itself constitute 
discrimination under Title IX.  This startling provision appears to imply 
colleges’ automatic liability if they fail to follow the detailed procedures.  
Because the grievance procedures are so cumbersome, complex, and 
technically precise, they will be hard not to violate.  The grievance procedures 
would thereby open colleges up to substantial liability. 
Perversely, the complexity and cost of the grievance procedures in the 
proposed regulations would encourage many colleges to do everything in 
their powers to avoid formal disciplinary hearings.  The proposed regulations 
create powerful incentives for institutional actors to try to persuade the parties 
to agree to informal resolution instead. 
 
 51. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(b)(1). 
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7)  Informal Resolution 
In contrast to the proposed regulations’ complex, technical, and costly 
formal grievance procedures, the proposed regulations’ informal procedures 
lack detail.  They simply require notice of the allegations and the 
consequences of agreeing to informal process, and the parties’ written 
consent.52  If a college provides the required notice and obtains the parties’ 
written consent, its actions in an informal process would fall within the safe 
harbor provision of the regulations, which ensures that “the recipient’s 
response to the formal complaint is not deliberately indifferent and does not 
otherwise constitute discrimination under [T]itle IX.”53  So while the formal 
grievance procedures open colleges up to considerable liability under Title 
IX due to the potential for technical violations of protocol, the informal 
resolution process insulates campuses from liability. 
This insulation from liability creates a robust incentive for colleges to 
persuade the parties to agree to an informal resolution process.  The problem 
is that the informal resolution process may be unfair to either complainants 
or respondents, and it may deny due process to either or both sides. 
Under the proposed regulations, informal resolution can happen: 
• Without any conflicts check to prevent bias on the part of 
mediators or institutional actors drafted to resolve the complaint 
informally, 
• Without any training on sexual harassment of the institutional 
actors involved, 
• Without any investigation by a neutral investigator of facts 
surrounding the allegation, 
• Without any hearing by a neutral arbiter to determine those facts, 
• With any possible informal process or outcome for either party as 
a result, and 
• With a prohibition on returning to the formal adjudication 
process.54 
Informal resolution could potentially expose students on either side to a 
range of due process violations or unfairness, at the whim of the institution.  
Two examples suffice: 
Example 1:  A first-year student claims to have been sexually assaulted on 
campus by the quarterback of the college’s celebrated football team.  The 
first-year student lodges a formal complaint against the quarterback with 
the Title IX coordinator.  College staff members are uncomfortable with the 
complaint and its potential for bad publicity, so they lean on the 
complainant and respondent to agree to an informal resolution of the 
situation.  The parties agree, and the college president then asks the football 
coach to mediate.  The coach takes the parties to a private room, yells at 
them that they are equally responsible for the situation, and demands that 
 
 52. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i)–(ii). 
 53. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(b)(1). 
 54. See Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6). 
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they apologize to each another.  The complainant runs out of the room, 
highly distraught, and drops out of college as a result. 
Example 2:  A first-year student claims to have been sexually assaulted on 
campus by the quarterback of the college’s celebrated football team.  The 
first-year student lodges a formal complaint against the quarterback with 
the Title IX coordinator.  College staff members are uncomfortable with the 
complaint and its potential for bad publicity, so they lean on the 
complainant and respondent to agree to an informal resolution of the 
situation.  The parties agree, and the college president hires the 
complainant’s aunt, an employee in the department of student affairs, to 
mediate.  The staff member takes the parties to a private room, berates the 
football player, and tells him that he will be removed from the football team.  
The respondent runs out of the room, highly distraught, and drops out of 
college as a result. 
These examples would have come out differently under the Department of 
Education’s prior guidance on Title IX, which did not allow for this kind of 
informal resolution.  They show how the practical result of establishing an 
informal resolution option with no requirements to protect the rights of the 
parties could erode the due process rights of either side.  The proposed 
regulations delineate complex requirements in formal grievance procedures, 
which will powerfully encourage informal resolution of complaints, and 
which will, ironically, mean that parties have no guarantee of even minimal 
due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed regulations repeatedly articulate a false equivalence under 
Title IX between the complainant and respondent in a manner contrary to the 
text and purpose of Title IX.55  For example, the beginning of the grievance 
procedures section states:  “[a] recipient’s treatment of a complainant in 
response to a formal complaint of sexual harassment may constitute 
discrimination on the basis of sex under [T]itle IX.  A recipient’s treatment 
of the respondent may also constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under 
[T]itle IX.”56 
 
 55. Title IX was designed to benefit those who are excluded from educational 
opportunities, not turn a blind eye to historic discrimination. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cty. 
Bd. of Educ, 526 U.S. 629, 639 (1999) (“It is Title IX’s ‘unmistakable focus on the benefited 
class,’ . . . rather than the perpetrator, that, in petitioner’s view, compels the conclusion that 
the statute works to protect students from the discriminatory misconduct of their peers”); 
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 175 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Title IX and its implementing 
regulations protect the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted . . . .  It is women 
and not men who have historically and who continue to be underrepresented in sports, not only 
at Brown, but at universities nationwide”); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 
168, 175 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A]lthough [T]itle IX and the regulation apply equally to boys as 
well as girls, it would require blinders to ignore that the motivation for promulgation of the 
regulation on athletics was the historic emphasis on boys’ athletic programs to the exclusion 
of girls’ athletic programs . . . .”). 
 56. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(a). 
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While it is true that a school’s treatment of a respondent could constitute 
sex discrimination under Title IX, under prior Department of Education 
guidance and case law, it would require unusual evidence of unfairness for a 
school to be found to violate a respondent’s Title IX rights in its response to 
a single complaint.57  The Department of Education now appears to disagree. 
Its commentary to the proposed grievance procedures contends that “a 
respondent can be unjustifiably separated from his or her education on the 
basis of sex, in violation of Title IX, if the recipient does not investigate and 
adjudicate using fair procedures before imposing discipline.”58  This 
language once again suggests that a failure to follow the detailed grievance 
procedures in the proposed regulations could itself constitute a per se 
violation of Title IX. 
On the one hand, the proposed regulations impose a deliberate indifference 
standard on institutional actions toward the complainant.  As the regulations 
and commentary make clear, the complainant has no right to an investigation 
of sexual harassment that happens outside an education program or activity,59 
no right to an investigation if the complaint is not lodged with the Title IX 
coordinator or the president of the college,60 no right to any particular 
“determination of responsibility,”61 and no right to “a particular sanction 
against the respondent.”62  None of those things constitutes even a potential 
violation of Title IX under the proposed regulations. 
On the other hand, the proposed regulations do not impose a deliberate 
indifference standard on institutional actions toward the respondent.  Indeed, 
any deviation from a strict and onerous set of grievance procedures designed 
to protect respondents may violate Title IX itself.  The safe harbor provisions 
clarify that, under the proposed regulations, the Title IX review by the 
Department of Education would focus on violations of the detailed grievance 
process in favor of respondents,63 rather than on substantive outcomes for 
victims of sexual harassment. 
The proposed regulations radically change the civil rights statute, turning 
Title IX on its head.  They would both reduce liability, with respect to how 
campuses respond to complaints of sexual harassment and sexual assault, and 
expand liability, with respect to how campuses carry out a set of mandatory, 
detailed grievance procedures in favor of respondents.  The proposed 
 
 57. See, e.g., Press Release, Office for Civil Rights, Students Accused of Sexual 
Misconduct Had Title IX Rights Violated by Wesley College, Says U.S. Department of 
Education (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/students-accused-sexual-
misconduct-had-title-ix-rights-violated-wesley-college-says-us-department-education 
[https://perma.cc/C4GB-9ZRF] (finding that “an interim suspension . . . imposed the same day 
as the college received the report against the student” and failure to ever interview the 
respondent violated Title IX). 
 58. Proposal at 61,472. 
 59. See Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a). 
 60. See Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.30, § 106.44(a); see also supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
 61. See Proposal at 61,471. 
 62. Proposal at 61,478. 
 63. Proposal at 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(b)(1). 
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regulations would substantially diminish institutional liability for sex 
discrimination, which is the purpose of Title IX, while exposing institutions 
to unprecedented liability from accused students.  The proposed regulations 
would undermine the very statute they are purportedly designed to carry out. 
At the same time, the proposed regulations would create incentives for 
colleges to try to avoid the cumbersome and expensive procedures mandated 
by the formal grievance process and instead urge students to agree to undergo 
informal resolution, where they would be guaranteed neither due process nor 
basic fairness. 
